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The decisions of the Supreme Court are heightened in significance par-
ticularly in those situations where, unless the appealing parties were en-
titled to review as on an involuntary nonsuit, the filing of a new suit would
be barred by the Statute of Limitations.8
This decisive declaration by the Supreme Court not only clarifies a matter
of technical procedure, but also removes the injustice of denying the right
to appellate review, because of non-conformance to what was, at best an
arbitrary and fictional requirement, i. e., the actual reading of the per-
emptory instruction to the jury which had no more than a ministerial func-
tion to perform. 9
ATTORNEYS-PRACTICE OF LAYMEN BEFORE ADmINISTRATIvE TRIBUNALS-
CONCURRENT REGULATORY POWERS OF JUDICIAL AND LEGSATIvB DEPART-
MENTS.-[Missouri] .- The Missouri Supreme Court, in a recent decision,1
was confronted with the question whether statutes regulating the practice of
law constitute an encroachment upon the power of the courts to define and
regulate the practice of law. The three unlicensed lay respondents admitted
that they had appeared before the Public Service Commission, a statutory
tribunal, representing parties litigant for a valuable consideration. The
court en bane decided unanimously that the respondents were in contempt
of court. Two judges reached this conclusion without applying a statute
which made the respondents' behavior a crime.2 The majority, in a well
written opinion by Chief Justice Ellison, held that the statute was a valid
manifestation of the legislative police power, and also that it furnished a
norm by which the court could judge persons accused of contempt for prac-
ticing law illegally. The majority also stated that if a statute should frus-
trate the administration of justice, the statute would be ignored.
In Re Richardss recognized that the Supreme Court has inherent power
to define and regulate the practice of law, and has original jurisdiction to
disbar attorneys. This involves the correlative power to prevent unauthor-
ized persons from practicing law. The respondents in the instant case
apparently contended that this judicial power was exclusive and therefore
that the General Assembly could not by legislation enter any field reached
by the court in the exercise of its inherent powers.
This theory of the respondents was accepted in 1909 in the Gilderslceve
case,4 which held that the courts have unlimited power to punish for con-
8. R. S. Mo. 1929, sees. 850, 860-864.
9. State ex rel. Witte Hardware Co. v. McElhinney, 100 S. W. (2d) 36
(Mo. App. 1937).
1. Clark v. Austin; Same v. Coon; Same v. Hull, 101 S. W. (2d) 977
(1937) (original proceedings in the Missouri Supreme Court).
2. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 11693.
3. 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933).
4. C., B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Gildersleeve, 219 Mo. 170, 181, 118 S. W. 86, 16
Ann. Cas. 749 (1909).
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tempt and therefore that the legislature cannot pass laws on that subject.
The court apparently feared that if the legislature had the power to regu-
late the practice of law, it would necessarily have the power to destroy
judicial independence. However, Judge Lamm, in the minority opinion of
the Gildersleeve case, demonstrated that "the power to regulate does not in
all cases ... mean the power to destroy."z Four years later in EX parte
Creasy," the Gildersleeve decision was overruled, and the minority opinion
of Judge Lamm was followed by the court without dissent. This minority
opinion was unanimously followed a second time in State ex rel. Selleck V.
Reynolds;7 and both decisions are referred to and followed in the Richards
case.8
The Richards case, and many others cited therein, further concede that
the legislature may enact laws on that same subject. The court in discuss-
ing its inherent power to disbar attorneys, said: "In the harmonious co-
ordination of powers necessary to effectuate the aim and end of government,
it may be regulated by statutes to aid in the accomplishment of the object
but not to frustrate or destroy it."9
Mr. Justice Story discussing the principle of separation of powers said:
"The true meaning is that the whole power of one of these departments
should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power
of either of the other departments."'1 This theory is supported by many
authorities."
The doctrine of the complete separation of powers has never been entirely
true in practice. The courts in this state have repeatedly recognized that
each of the three departments normally exercises powers which are not
strictly within its province. 2 This literal and reasonable construction is
founded on the necessities inherent in all governments.
Moreover, statutes regulating the practice of law, have been passed
since the earliest days in our history.13 The great weight of authority holds
that the enactment of such statutes is a valid exercise of the police power.14
5. Ibid.
6. 243 Mo. 679, 708, 148 S. W. 914, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 478 (1912).
7. 252 Mo. 369, 379, 158 S. W. 671 (1913).
8. In Re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 915, 63 S. W. (2d) 672 (1933).
9. Ibid.
10. 1 Story, Constitution (5th ed. 1905) sec. 525, p. 393.
11. Rhodes v. Bell, 230 Mo. 138, 150, 130 S. W. 465 (1910) ; State ex rel.
Manion v. Dawson, 284 Mo. 490, 506, 225 S. W. 97 (1920) ; People v. Simon,
176 Ill. 165, 171, 52 N. E. 910, 68 Am. St. Rep. 175, 44 L. R. A. 801 (1898).
12. State ex rel. Manion v. Dawson; Rhodes v. Bell; both supra, note 11;
In Re Birmingham Drainage District, 274 Mo. 140, 150, 202 S. W. 404
(1918).
13. R. S. Mo. 1835, p. 89.
14. 6 C. J., Attorney & Client (1916) 572, sec. 16; In Re Day, 181 Ill.
73, 95, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A. 519 (1899) (a leading case on this ques-
tion) ; State ex inf. Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 865,
871, 74 S. W. (2d) 348 (1934). In Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S. 333, 379,
18 L. ed. 366 (1866), the Supreme Court of the United States said: "The
legislature may undoubtedly prescribe qualifications for the office [of at-
torney] to which he must conform."
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The decisions quoted and cited above clearly establish the proposition
that in Missouri the General Assembly may enact statutes regulating the
legal profession, as it does other professions and businesses. The enact-
ment of such statutes is not an encroachment upon the inherent power of
the Supreme Court to define and regulate the practice of law. The two
powers, judicial and legislative, exist concurrently so long as the legislative
power does not destroy or frustrate the judicial power.15
A. X. S.
BANKS AND BANKING-CONTRACTS OF INFANTS-DISTINCTION BETWEEN
LOAN AND DEPOST.-[Missouri].-Plaintiff, a minor, placed $900 with de-
fendant bank on time deposit, receiving a time certificate of deposit payable
six or twelve months after date, bearing interest. Thereafter defendant
bank became insolvent, and plaintiff, having reached the age of twenty-one,
filed claim for the $900. Her claim was classified as a common claim. Plain-
tiff filed a bill in equity disaffirming the contract and praying that she be
given a prior lien on the assets of the bank. Held, that disaffirmance of the
contract rendered it void ab initio, and that plaintiff was entitled to a prior
lien.' The reason given for the decision was that the transaction was not a
deposit, but a loan to the bank, and was therefore voidable at her option,
either during minority or within a reasonable time after attaining majority.
The court indicates that had the transaction been a "deposit," the result
might have been different, citing Phillips v. Tmst Company.2
In the Phillips case plaintiff was a St. Louis school child, who, with many
other children, had placed money with defendant trust company in a savings
account, evidenced by a pass book. When the company became insolvent,
plaintiff brought suit to establish the balance due him as a preferred claim
against the company's assets. The court held that although disaffirmance
of a minor's contract renders it void ab initio, yet where the contract is
beneficial to the minor, he cannot disaffirm-an exception to the general
rule of disaffirmance.3 Plaintiff attempted to establish a trust, but the
statute upon which he relied was construed to mean that a minor may
deposit his money in a savings account and withdraw it as though he were
of full age.4 A similar statute applies to a bank like that in the instant
15. Clark v. Austin; Same v. Coon; Same v. Hull, 101 S. W. (2d) 977
(Mo. 1937).
1. Stinson v. Bank of Queen City, 101 S. W. (2d) 537 (Mo. App. 1937).
2. 85 S. W. (2d) 923 (Mo. App. 1935).
3. Pinnell v. St. Louis San Francisco R. Co., 263 S. W. 182, 41 A. L. R.
1092 (Mo. 1924); Smalley v. Central Trust and Savings Co., 72 Ind. App.
296, 125 N. E. 789 (1920) ; Robinson v. Coulter, 90 Tenn. 705, 18 S. W. 250,
25 Am. St. Rep. 708 (1891); Aborn v. Janis, 113 N. Y. Supp. 309, 62 Misc.
Rep. 95 (1907).
4. Phillips v. Trust Co., 85 S. W. (2d) 923, 927 (Mo. App. 1935). The
statute, R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5465, provides: "When any deposit shall be
made by or in the name of any minor, the same shall be held for the
exclusive right and benefit of such minor, and free from the control or lien
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